In Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: A Case Study in 15th-Century Fides-Ratio Controversy, K.M. Ziebart presents an account of the Cusan epistemology as a fascinating late-medieval attempt to definitively harmonize faith and reason.

t. 1. Filosofii͡a : samosoznanie cheloveka i obshchestva -- t. 2. Politika i istoriosofii͡a -- t. 3. Politika i diplomatii͡a -- t. 4. Kulʹtura i sovremennostʹ -- t. 5. Zapadnoevropeĭskai͡a filosofii͡a, politika i kulʹtura: problemy i perspektivy.

Sociology, when it has come forward as a real science , has not been regarded with favor even in the West.

Immediately after the publication of Darwin's book on the origin of species, Engels, having familiarized himself with it, wrote to Marx on December 12, 1859: "All in all, Darwin, whom I am reading right now, is superb. Teleology had hitherto not yet been destroyed in one of its aspects, and now this has been done. Moreover, hitherto there has never been so sweeping an attempt to prove historical development in nature, especially with such success." Soon Marx enlarged upon the evaluation (...) of Darwinism. In his letter of December 19, 1860, he commented that this theory "provides a foundation in natural history for our views." It is therefore no accident that Engels, in developing the principles of dialectical materialism and problems of the dialectics of nature, interested himself so deeply and comprehensively in the theory of evolution. (shrink)

In his reply to my previous article Professor Tatum has added some interesting material to the discussion and has made some points which invite further examination. He rightly stresses that the statement in the added first line, that the dead man had been flamen Dialis, would have conflicted with the hopes expressed in the original epitaph if we think these hopes referred to success in war and politics. This objection would be equally relevant if the Publius of the epitaph were (...) the grandson proposed by Sumner or any other young Scipio who, though robust enough for a public career, died prematurely. (shrink)

This monograph aims to mathematically codify the notion of "moral systems" and define a sensible distance between them. It consists of three parts, aimed at an audience with varying interests and mathematical backgrounds. The first part steers philosophical, formally defining moral systems and several related concepts. The second part studies black box algorithms, including questions of inference and metric construction. The third part explores the technical construction of metrics amongst conditional probability distributions.

'The law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgment'. So says Lord Scarman, outlining the hitherto accepted 'Bolam' standard, in his recent speech in the House of Lords decision of Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital, reflecting earlier judicial dicta suggesting that it is for the medical profession rather than the courts to determine whether or not a medical practitioner has achieved the required standard of care (1). It is suggested here that (...) this concept is bad in principle, and that the weight of judicial authority is against it. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on two moral values implied by the case study but not specified in the working party's conclusions, namely equitable treatment of the most vulnerable and the value of political government.

Narrative ethics taps into an inherent human need to tell our own stories centred on our own moral values and to have those stories heard and acknowledged. However, not everyone’s words are afforded equal power. The use of narrative ethics in bioethical decision-making is problematized by a disparity in whose stories are told, whose stories are heard, and whose stories are believed. Here, I conduct an analysis of narrative ethics through a critical theory lens to show how entrenched patterns of (...) narrative neglect in medicine are harming not only our capacity to make use of narrative ethics but also our capacity to deliver effective healthcare. To illustrate this point, I use three examples where the patient’s gender affects how their stories unfold: autism, weight, and pain management. From these, I argue that the use of narrative ethics without the application of a critical theory lens risks the exacerbation of what Miranda Fricker refers to as “testimonial injustice,” the prima facie harm experienced by individuals whose credibility is undermined by others’ prejudices. Finally, I suggest that narrative ethics can be a powerful tool for mitigating oppressive practices in medicine if we couple it with critical analysis that enables us to understand the power dynamics at play in storytelling. (shrink)